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This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder 
"voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a 
regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. 
Adopting SoP leads to large increases in market value (4.6%) and to improvements in 
long-term performance: profitability and labor productivity increase, while overheads 
and investment fall. In contrast, we find limited effects on pay levels and structure. This 
suggests that SoP operates as a regular vote of confidence, increasing efficiency and 
market value. 
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1. Introduction 
How much "voice" should shareholders have in a modern corporation? When 
shareholders disagree with the course a corporation is taking and exercising 
control is not possible or too costly, there are two main mechanisms by which to 
express their dissent: they can sell their shares (exit), or engage with management 
and express their opinions, i.e. use the "voice" mechanism (Hirschman, 1970). 
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While the impact of exiting on the value of the firm and on its policies has been 
studied extensively, less attention has been devoted to the impact of voice. 
Hirschman (1970) first introduced the idea that voice was an important 
mechanism in the correct operation of institutions (from firms to public schools), 
yet, there is little systematic causal evidence on the actual impact of voice as a 
disciplining mechanism within firms.  
This paper studies the consequences of Say-on-Pay, a mechanism that gives 
shareholders a voice by allowing them to vote on executive pay, and its 
relationship to firm performance. Say-on-Pay targets directly the relationship 
between executive pay and performance since the vote is not just about the level 
of pay per se but whether it reflects the value that the CEO adds to the firm. It 
thus becomes an explicit vote of confidence, aggregating the opinions of 
shareholders into a simple, highly visible metric. Indeed, to date, it is the only 
mandatory mechanism that regularly allows all shareholders to directly and 
publicly express their opinions of how the firm is run. 
Our goal is to provide a causal estimate of the effects of giving shareholders a 
voice through the Say-on-Pay mechanism on the value of the firm and on 
executive compensation. We measure the immediate effect on stock market 
returns and shareholder value, as well as longer term effects on accounting 
performance, firm policies, productivity and CEO compensation.  
In order to understand the mechanisms through which Say-on-Pay affects firm 
value we use a regression discontinuity design on the vote outcomes of 
shareholder-sponsored Say-on-Pay proposals at annual meetings between 2006 
and 2010. This provides direct evidence of the consequences of giving 
shareholders a voice in the running of the company through Say-on-Pay. 
 Research on the voice mechanism within the shareholder activism literature 
has focused primarily on the role of activist funds in negotiations with 
management (e.g. Gantchev, forthcoming), or the effect of governance proposals 
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(e.g. Gillan and Starks, 2000, 2007). Proponents of Say-on-Pay argue that it 
strengthens shareholder oversight and can limit executive compensation excesses. 
Its critics counter that it undermines the power of the board and can be very costly 
to the firm, a view seemingly borne out by the way in which it is systematically 
opposed by management. Indeed when we looked at the proxy materials mailed to 
shareholders of the firms in our sample, in over 99 percent of cases management 
had made a ‘vote against’ recommendation in response to shareholder Say-on-Pay 
proposals. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act made Say-on-Pay compulsory at all U.S. firms with effect from 2011, a 
measure that continues to be a source of contention.  
Knowledge of the effects of Say-on-Pay, however, remains limited and the 
debate on its merits has been hampered by a lack of causal evidence on its 
consequences.1 While the adoption of Say-on-Pay is correlated with multiple firm 
attributes and hence highly endogenous, it is obviously impossible to randomly 
allocate this policy measure to different firms and examine the subsequent stock 
market reaction or changes in performance and pay policy. Moreover, investors 
incorporate expectations as they receive information on the value of adopting a 
Say-on-Pay proposal, making it difficult to capture its effects using changes in 
market prices in the absence of individual events where unexpected information is 
released.  
We therefore use votes on Say-on-Pay proposals at annual meetings as a quasi-
experimental setting. Our sample includes 250 cases of proposals to adopt the 
Say-on-Pay policy filed with the SEC by shareholders of S&P 1500 firms 
between 2006 and 2010.2 We use a regression discontinuity design that compares 
 
1 In particular, there is no evidence (causal or non-causal) on the mid- to long-term performance effects of Say-on-Pay. 
There is some mixed evidence on the market response from event studies as well as on its effects on and interaction with 
compensation (e.g. for the U.S.: Cai and Walkling, 2011 and Larcker, Ormazabal and Taylor, 2011; for the U.K.: Ferri and 
Maber, 2010). 
2Note that we study the votes to adopt the policy. If the policy is adopted, shareholders vote on the relationship between 
CEO pay and performance in subsequent meetings. 
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the stock market reaction and other outcomes of Say-on-Pay proposals that pass 
by a small margin to those that fail by a small margin (similar to Mas and Lee, 
2012, or in an event-study setting to Cuñat, Gine and Guadalupe, 2012). The 
intuition behind this strategy is that the characteristics of firms where a Say-on-
Pay proposal passes with 50.1% of the vote will be similar to those where it gets 
49.9% and fails to pass. However, this small difference will have a major impact 
on the probability of the proposals being implemented. In other words, for a 
‘close call’, passing is akin to an independent random event that is correlated with 
the implementation of the proposal but is ‘locally’ exogenous (uncorrelated with 
other firms’ characteristics). We show that for votes around the threshold, passing 
is uncorrelated with the observed firm and meeting characteristics. Moreover, 
when studying the stock market reaction, it is precisely in such close-call 
situations that the vote contains substantial information — switching from an 
unpredictable outcome to either pass or fail— that is not already fully 
incorporated in the stock price. Thus the regression discontinuity design delivers a 
causal estimate of the expected value of adopting Say-on-Pay. 
We find that Say-on-Pay significantly increases shareholder value. On the day 
of the vote, a Say-on-Pay proposal that passes yields an abnormal return of 2.4% 
relative to one that fails. Since the outcome of the vote is not binding, the market 
reaction should only account for the increase in the probability that the proposal 
will be implemented after a positive shareholder vote. We collected information 
on whether each proposal in our sample was implemented, and find a 52.5% 
higher probability of implementation for proposals that narrowly pass the 
threshold, implying that Say-on-Pay will deliver an increase in shareholder value 
of about 4.6%. This is of the same order of magnitude as removing two anti-
takeover provisions (as estimated in Cuñat, Gine and Guadalupe, 2012). 
Where do these large market gains come from? In principle, there are two 
distinct channels through which a Say-on-Pay policy can improve firm 
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performance. First, by giving shareholders a mechanism through which to express 
their opinions, it increases board monitoring and pressure on the CEO, potentially 
leading to enhanced performance. Second, Say-on-Pay can potentially affect the 
level and structure of executive pay, such that there is a greater alignment with 
performance. 
Our results confirm that Say-on-Pay has a strong positive impact on firms’ 
accounting and operational performance in the years following the vote (that is, 
beyond the short-term market reaction). Firms that implement Say-on-Pay have 
higher growth in earnings per share, return on assets, return on equity and Tobin's 
Q one year after the vote. They also see a higher increase in productivity (sales 
per worker) one year and two years after the vote. And they also reduce their 
overheads (SG&A) and capital expenditure, suggesting increased efficiency along 
different dimensions. In short, there is overwhelming evidence of efficiency and 
profitability gains achieved through the implementation of Say-on-Pay proposals. 
The effects on executive compensation are smaller. We find no systematic 
change to the level or structure of CEO compensation, or to the probability that 
the CEO leaves the firm after a positive Say-on-Pay vote. There is a slight 
reduction (four percent) in the rate of salary increases. While there are significant 
changes in the composition of pay, these are not consistent across measures or 
over time. No systematic pattern in changes to compensation is apparent, although 
the lack of an average effect on the level or structure of compensation may mask 
the fact that different firms adjust compensation along different (and maybe 
opposing) dimensions. In short, the claim that Say-on-Pay leads to large, across-
the-board reductions in executive compensation is ruled out. 
In sum, our findings suggest that Say-on-Pay serves to monitor and incentivize 
CEOs to deliver better firm performance by providing a clear mechanism for 
shareholders to voice their opinions, as confirmed by major improvements in 
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shareholder value and firm performance among the firms in our sample.3 These 
results, together with the strong opposition of executives to adopting such 
measures, suggest that current governance structures in the U.S. give insufficient 
voice to shareholders of large corporations. 
Given the evidence that Say-on-Pay significantly benefits shareholders, why 
don’t all firms embrace it? One possibility is that the positive effects are confined 
to firms in our sample which proposed to adopt Say-on-Pay – and hence the 
returns to implementing the proposal were largest (regression discontinuity yields, 
by design, a local estimate). Within our sample firms management is 
systematically opposed to Say-on-Pay, while our results suggest that where the 
proposal narrowly failed shareholders would have benefited from it passing. This 
suggests a fundamental misalignment of objectives between management, boards 
and shareholders, as well as the shareholders’ inability to bring about change. 
Our findings may be useful to determine the appropriate role of government 
regulation and shareholder activism in shaping corporate governance structures. 
Say-on-Pay is compulsory in the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and the UK. 
In the US, the controversy around Say-on-Pay continues. While the Dodd-Frank 
Financial Regulation Act made Say-on-Pay compulsory as of 2011, the Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012 eliminated the requirement for firms 
with gross annual revenues of less than $1 billion. Since this paper provides 
evidence that Say-on-Pay (and more broadly giving shareholders a greater voice) 
has substantial positive effects on firm value and performance, it should help to 
guide the debate. 
 
3The main difference between firms in the sample (those targeted by a Say-on-pay vote between 2006 and 2010) and the 
rest of the S&P 1500 firms is size. Firms in the sample are clearly larger (in sales and employment), but the difference in 
operating ratios or other variables is significantly reduced or disappears once size is controlled for. This is consistent with 
the findings in Cai and Walkling (2011). 
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2. Background 
2.1. Say-on-Pay Policies 
Say-on-Pay policies are the result of a general trend towards requiring greater 
executive accountability, transparency, and shareholder rights. They have 
emerged following an increase in the number of shareholder proposals on 
compensation-related matters submitted to a vote at annual meetings (see Ertimur, 
Ferri and Muslu, 2011 for an analysis of shareholder activism and pay). 
Our data consists of 250 shareholder proposals filed with the SEC between 
2006 and 2010, to give shareholders an advisory vote on executive pay (see Table 
1). Firms that adopt Say-on-Pay commit to giving shareholders a regular vote on 
whether executive pay is commensurate with firm performance. Companies such 
as Motorola, Target, Raytheon and Pfizer were all ‘targets’ of Say-on-Pay 
proposals in that period.4 It was this increasing focus on Say-on-Pay in the U.S. 
culminated with its incorporation in the Dodd-Frank Act (July 2010) that 
regulates the governance and disclosure practices of public companies. Among 
other provisions, it gave shareholders the right to a regular advisory vote on 
current and future executive compensation. As of 2011 this has been mandatory 
for all U.S. listed firms.5  
Proponents of the bill claim that Say-on-Pay strengthens the relationship 
between the board, executives and shareholders, ensuring that board members 
fulfill their fiduciary duty. Critics insist that Say-on-Pay does not effectively 
 
4 A noteworthy case was the Verizon Say-on-Pay proposal in 2007, which was approved by a narrow majority of 50.18%. 
The board decided to implement it starting in 2009. Shareholders gave the following rationale for proposing to adopt Say-
on-Pay at Verizon: "We believe that the current rules governing senior executive compensation do not give shareholders 
sufficient influence over pay practices — nor do they give the Board adequate feedback from the owners of the company". 
This suggests increased voice, in the form of increased "feedback" and "influence" was an important goal of the proposal. 
The proposal also stated that Say-on-Pay would "...encourage shareholders to scrutinize the new, more extensive 
disclosures required by the SEC," suggesting that the incentive for shareholders to monitor increases when they have better 
tools to take action (a recurrent argument in Hirschman, 1970). 
5The Dodd-Frank Act required an additional vote regarding the frequency of the compensation approval vote: to occur 
every 1, 2, or 3 years. 
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monitor compensation, and is an intrusive measure that undermines the board’s 
authority. 
On average, shareholders voted 43% in favor of adopting Say-on-Pay 
proposals (Table 1). This is larger than the average vote on corporate governance 
shareholder proposals (36%) and relative to all other compensation proposals 
(23%).  
2.2. Expected effects of Say-on-Pay 
Given that Say-on-Pay votes are non-binding, it could be argued that it should 
have no effect on executive or director behavior, and hence firm outcomes. 
However, given the potential costs associated with it (e.g. legal costs, cost of 
managing the relationship with investors), the net effect of putting Say-on-Pay in 
place may well be negative even if it has no effect on behavior. It may be 
detrimental in other respects. For example, since the board of directors is more 
informed (about the company) than the average shareholder, it should be better 
placed to make decisions. Likewise, directors (and CEOs) may have access to 
information that is best withheld from the market; restricting their freedom to 
decide may be value-destroying for shareholders. 
There are a number of channels through which Say-on-Pay may positively 
affect firm performance. A popular view is that Say-on-Pay curbs excessive 
executive pay, although the potential gains from the point of view of shareholder 
value are modest relative to total firm value. A slightly different mechanism 
operates via a better alignment of pay with performance: any improved incentives 
resulting from Say-on-Pay should make CEOs more effective at generating higher 
profits. Say-on-Pay allows shareholders to express dissent. Where adopted, it 
becomes an established part of the votes that shareholders cast at annual meetings 
(along with the election of directors and other governance votes, for example). 
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Since it is the only regular vote on the link between pay and performance, it is 
akin to a referendum or vote of confidence in the CEO – empowering 
shareholders by providing a mechanism through which they can punish a CEO for 
poor performance. Even though the outcome of the vote is purely ‘advisory’ 
(rather than binding), it aggregates shareholder opinion into a simple, visible 
metric and may serve to coordinate further action to remove management or board 
members. It gives shareholders a "voice" (Hirschman, 1970) with which they may 
discipline managers, making their monitoring (and the incentive to monitor) more 
effective. 
2.3. Related Literature 
Empirical evidence on Say-on-Pay in the U.S. provides mixed results. Cai and 
Walkling (2011), using an event study methodology, find that the Say-on-Pay bill 
passed in the House of Representatives in April 2010 created value for firms with 
inefficient executive compensation and with weak governance. However, they 
find that the announcement of shareholder Say-on-Pay proposals between 2006 
and 2008 had a negative effect on share price, and a positive effect when the 
proposal was defeated. Larcker, Ormazabal and Taylor (2011) examine a broader 
set of legislative events on several aspects of pay (including Say-on-Pay) and 
found no consistent pattern in market reactions to such events. Ferri and Maber 
(2013) examine the implementation of Say-on-Pay regulation in 2002 in the 
United Kingdom and find, also in an event study setting, a positive market 
reaction to the regulation in firms with weak penalties for poor performance. 
One possible reason for these mixed findings is that with standard event study 
methodologies the event date can be confounded by various items or news and 
information being released to the market on the same date. As discussed below, 
our estimation strategy (the regression discontinuity design) deals with this 
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problem and actually estimates a causal effect.  
Ferri and Maber (2013) examine the effect of the U.K. Say-on-Pay regulation 
on pay ex-post and find some evidence that it increased the sensitivity of CEO pay 
to poor accounting performance (but not to stock performance), that is, it curbed 
the "pay for failure" scenario. To date, however, there is no evidence on the 
impact of Say-on-Pay on the detailed components of pay in the U.S. or on long-
term firm performance in any of these countries. 
3. Data and identification strategy 
3.1. Data description 
We obtained data on Say-on-Pay proposals from Riskmetrics. The dataset 
includes information on all the proposals voted on in the S&P1500 universe and 
an additional 500 widely held firms. Our sample consists of 250 shareholder-
sponsored proposals voted on at annual meetings from 2006 until the 21st of July 
of 2010 to implement Say-on-Pay provisions.6 Riskmetrics provides information 
on the company name, the date of the annual meeting and the percentage of votes 
in favor of the proposal7.  
Panel A of Table 1 shows the distribution of proposals by year and some vote 
statistics. The number of voted proposals increased throughout the period as well 
as the proportion of votes in favor. As a result the percentage of proposals passed 
increased from 15% in 2007 to 25% in 2010. Our identification strategy relies on 
proposals with a close-call outcome. More than half of the proposals in our 
sample fall within ten percentage points of the majority threshold and lend power 
 
6The end date of the sample is chosen to match the date in which the final bill that makes Say-on-Pay compulsory was 
signed. The last observation in the sample corresponds to the 11th of June of 2010. Actually, 258 proposals were filed with 
the SEC in the sample period, but throughout the paper we drop four observations with extreme abnormal returns (firms 
above the top and below the bottom 1%) on the day of the vote, as well as those with missing abnormal returns on the day 
of the vote. This leaves us with a sample of 250 observations. 
7 Two observations were reported to have exactly 50% of the votes in favor, so we checked whether they were considered 
to have passed and they did not. We therefore code them as “fail” with 49.9% of the vote. 
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to our identification. 
We used additional information from a number of sources: security prices from 
CRSP were used to calculate daily abnormal returns with a standard OLS model 
and also with the three Fama-French factors plus a momentum factor as in Carhart 
(1997).8 Financial information came from Compustat and executive compensation 
from Execucomp. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of our sample and defines 
all the variables used in the paper. 
 
3.2. Identification strategy 
 
 We are interested in the impact of passing a Say-on-Pay proposal on an 
outcome variable for firm f at time t, yf t (this can be the stock market reaction or 
subsequent performance and pay policies). We define vft as the votes in favor of a 
Say-on-Pay proposal, v* as the majority threshold for a proposal to pass and an 
indicator for pass as Dft = 1(vft ≥ v*), and write: 
 yf t = Κ + Dftθ + uft   (1) 
 The effect of interest is captured by the coefficient θ, while the error term 
uft represents all other determinants of the outcome (E[uft] = 0). However, this 
regression is unlikely to give a consistent estimate , for instance because 
passing a proposal is correlated with omitted variables that are themselves 
correlated with yft, or in the presence of reverse causality, such that E(Dft, uft) ≠ 0 . 
 To obtain a causal estimate of the effect of Say-on-Pay proposals we use a 
regression discontinuity estimate, which exploits the fact that in an arbitrarily 
small interval around the discontinuity (the threshold v*) whether the proposal 
passed or failed is akin to a random outcome. Lee (2008) shows that as long as 
there is a (possibly small) random component to the vote, the assignment to 
 
8The estimation period is 200 days, ending two months prior to the event date.  
θˆ
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“treatment” (pass and Dft = 1) and “control” groups (fails and Dft = 0) is random 
around the threshold. A simple nonparametric way to estimate  is therefore to 
measure the difference in average yft between Say-on-Pay proposals that either 
pass or do not by a narrow margin of votes. This is an unbiased estimate of θ that 
can be interpreted as causal. However, a more efficient way to estimate the effect 
consists of fitting a flexible function that captures the continuous relationship 
between yf t and v, allowing for a discontinuous jump at the discontinuity v*. 
Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), we approximate the underlying relationship 
between yft and vf t, with two different polynomials for observations on the right-
hand side of the threshold Pr(vft, γr) and on the left-hand side of the threshold 
Pl(vft, γl), and we also include year dummies ατ : 
 yf t  = Dft θ + Pr(vf t, γ
r)  + Pl(vf t, γ
l )  + ατ + uf t  (2)  
 The polynomials Pr(vft,γr) and Pl(vft,γl) capture any continuous 
relationship between yft and vft, in particular, the effect of any confounding factors 
that are correlated both with the vote and firm characteristics in a continuous 
way.9 At the same time,θ captures the discrete changes in yft at the majority 
threshold, and is a consistent estimate of the causal effect of the passing of a 
proposal on yft.10 This procedure is a more efficient way to estimate the effect than 
a simple comparison of means around the threshold as all the observations 
participate in the estimation. The estimate of θ captures the weighted average 
 
9 Note that we are considering other events at the annual meeting as part of the regression noise. This is correct as long 
as other unexpected events are not correlated with a close-call pass or fail. We confirmed that a close-call pass on Say-on-
Pay does not predict whether a close-call vote on other proposals in the same meeting will pass or fail. An alternative 
approach is to estimate a discontinuity model for all the proposals in a meeting simultaneously, as in Cuñat, Giné, 
Guadalupe (2012). The results for this method yield very similar results as can be seen in Table A3. For simplicity and 
parsimonia we use the simpler specification of equation (2) throughout this paper. 
10 Note that in practice, given that Say-on-Pay proposals are not binding, we are in a “fuzzy discontinuity design” setting 
and are estimating an Intent to Treat effect. To obtain the Treatment on the Treated, we could instrument whether the 
proposal is implemented with the vote outcome. However, as we show in Section 4.2, while discontinuous at the threshold, 
the vote does not predict implementation with strong enough significance to have a good first stage. Hence the paper shows 
Intent to Treat effects, although we provide an estimate of the treatment on the treated for the market value response by 
rescaling the ITT effect by the probability of implementation as a function of the vote. 
θˆ
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effect across all firms, where more weight is given to those firms in which a close 
election was expected. We chose a polynomial of order three to each side of the 
discontinuity after checking that the results were robust to using polynomials of 
order four and five.11  
Note that the combination of a regression discontinuity design with an event 
study setting has some additional desirable properties that are absent from 
traditional event studies. First, to the extent that the market can predict the vote, 
votes that win or lose by large margins will already be incorporated into prices 
prior to the vote and hence we should expect no significant price reaction far from 
the discontinuity. The closer the actual vote is to the discontinuity, the higher the 
ex-ante uncertainty that is resolved by the outcome of the vote (whether the 
proposal effectively passes or fails). Hence we expect the largest market response 
around the discontinuity. In fact, how fast the abnormal return becomes zero as a 
function of the distance to the threshold is an indication of the precision with 
which the market was able to predict the vote.  Second, the prior expectations of 
the market about the implementation of the proposal are identical on both sides of 
the discontinuity, so the combination of an event study with a regression 
discontinuity design naturally takes care of any anticipated events prior to the 
vote.12 
 
3.3 Sample characteristics, external validity and pre-existing differences 
 
In this section we investigate two selection issues that are important to 
understand the scope and external validity of our results. The first is to assess 
 
11 The order of the polynomial has to be chosen to balance having a function that is flexible enough to capture the effect 
of any omitted variables that are continuous at the threshold and the loss of degrees of freedom. 
12 Cuñat, Giné, and Guadalupe (2012) give a more detailed account of these properties and show that the regression 
discontinuity estimate captures the expected value of the proposal (given implementation probabilities) after a positive 
vote. More generally, they show the conditions under which the value of implementing a proposal can be recovered in an 
event-study setting from the regression discontinuity estimate. 
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whether the firms in our sample are representative of a broader population of 
firms. To do so we compare firms with a Say-on-Pay proposal in our sample to 
the general population of S&P 1500 firms. The second relates to the selection of 
firms within our sample into treated and non-treated firms. To the extent that the 
exact vote outcome around the threshold is random, our identification strategy 
implies there is no selection into treatment around the discontinuity, that is, firms 
that pass a Say-on-Pay provision by few votes should ex-ante be comparable to 
firms that reject a Say-on-Pay provision by a small margin. We run a number of 
tests to evaluate the validity of this assumption. 
First, since the Riskmetrics sample only includes the subset of firms targeted 
by votes on Say-on-Pay, we compare those to the population they are sampled 
from (S&P 1500 firms). Appendix Table A1 presents detailed summary statistics 
of firm characteristics for firms in our sample as well as for the universe of 
S&P1500 firms both in 2005.13 A systematic difference between them appears to 
be firm size. Larger firms are significantly more likely to hold a Say-on-Pay vote: 
they have higher total market value, more employees, higher total CEO pay and 
less dispersed ownership14 – all characteristics of large firms. As is common 
among larger firms, they also have higher leverage and, accordingly, return on 
equity. However, once one looks at other profitability ratios that control for size 
and leverage the differences become smaller or disappear (as is also shown in Cai 
and Walkling, 2011). Similarly, total annual CEO pay is larger in our sample 
relative to the whole of Execucomp (average of $11m and $5m respectively). 
 
13 We restrict the comparison to 2005 to avoid that the year stratification or the effects of Say-on-Pay could drive the 
results. 
14 In the bottom panel of Table A1 one can see the typical structure of votes in our sample. Institutional investors have 
on average 72% of the votes, although these are quite dispersed among them. There are on average two shareholders with 
holdings above 5% and the top five investors accumulate on average 21% of the votes. In none of our observations do the 
top 5 shareholders accumulate enough votes to constitute a majority of votes. On average, a substantial number of votes are 
held by dispersed shareholders, which reduces the ex-ante predictability of the vote. 
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However, if we compute the residual of total CEO pay after controlling firm size 
(assets) and market returns (through second order polynomials by industry level 
in those variables -- variable labeled “abnormal pay” in Table A1) the difference 
in pay drops to $1m and it is not statistically significant. While these differences 
do not bias our estimate of the treatment effect, they have to be taken into account 
when generalizing the results to a broader population of firms. 
Second, in Appendix Table A2 we investigate whether there are any systematic 
pre-existing differences between those firms that pass Say-on-Pay and those that 
do not. We find some differences when we compare all firms that pass Say-on-
Pay to all those that do not, indicating that the decision to adopt Say-on-Pay is 
endogenous to firm characteristics. However, these differences mostly disappear 
around the discontinuity, i.e. when we estimate specification (2) using firm 
characteristics prior to the vote as the dependent variable (a detailed discussion of 
the table can be found in the Appendix). This absence of observable differences 
around the discontinuity lends support to our identification strategy. 
Finally, we analyze the distribution of shareholder votes. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of votes within the sample. First, the average and median vote is 
slightly below the majority threshold, but 64% of the observations fall within 10 
percentage points of the majority threshold. This implies that our regression 
discontinuity coefficient is estimated from a large and significant share of the 
actual votes and hence can be thought of as representative of the effect of Say-on-
Pay on the average firm in our sample. Second, Figures 1 and 2 show that the 
distribution of votes is continuous at the 50% threshold, suggesting that there is 
no strategic voting or withdrawal of proposals for close-call votes. 15  
Overall, this section shows that the assumptions behind our identification 
 
15The formal continuity test in Figure 2 (see McCrary 2008) rejects the discontinuity of the distribution at the majority 
threshold. Cuñat, Giné and Guadalupe (2012) show a similar lack of strategic voting for all shareholder-sponsored 
proposals, while Listokin (2008) documents that strategic withdrawal of proposals is a real issue for management-
sponsored proposals (which implies this analysis should not be done on management proposals). 
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strategy — continuity of votes at the majority threshold and lack of preexisting 
differences in the neighborhood of pass — do hold and allow us to estimate a 
clean causal effect. It also shows that the main distinguishing difference between 
firms in our sample and the sampling universe is firm size, which should be taken 
into account when generalizing the results to a broader population of firms. 
4. Results 
4.1. The effect of Say-on-Pay on abnormal returns 
To evaluate the impact of Say-on-Pay provisions on shareholder value we first 
examine the market reaction to passing a Say-on-Pay proposal. Table 3 reports 
estimates of the difference in abnormal returns between Say-on-Pay proposals that 
pass and those that do not. Columns 1 to 5 present non-parametric estimates. To 
isolate the causal effect of Say-on-Pay on value, under our identification strategy, 
we estimate θ as the difference in abnormal returns between proposals that pass 
and those that do not pass for increasingly small intervals around the majority 
threshold. Column 1 estimates are based on the whole sample. As expected, we 
find that there is no difference, on average, between proposals that pass and those 
that fail (a small point estimate of -0.00210 that is not statistically different from 
zero) reflecting that for proposals that pass or fail by a large margin, the market 
has already incorporated the expected vote outcome in prices. Columns 2 and 3 
restrict the sample to within ten percentage points and five percentage points of 
the threshold, respectively. As we narrow the margin of votes around the pass 
threshold, we begin to see a small increase in the estimates, though the standard 
errors are still large. For votes within two and half percentage points of the 
threshold (column 4), we observe an estimate of 1.39% abnormal return that is 
significant at the 5% confidence level. Finally, if we narrow the window to within 
one and half percentage points, we observe that the estimate still follows an 
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increasing pattern, reaching a statistically significant abnormal return of 1.88%. 
Column 6 shows the regression for equation (2) for the entire sample, when we 
allow for a discontinuous jump at the majority threshold, but we control for two 
polynomials of order three in the vote share on each side of it. The results are 
consistent with the non-parametric ones: the abnormal return of firms that pass a 
Say-on-Pay proposal is 2.4% higher than for firms that do not pass such 
proposals. The point estimate in column 6 is larger and more precisely estimated 
than that in column 5, but the two estimates are not statistically different. 
Panel B of Table 3 shows the same set of regressions using as an alternative 
benchmark the four factor model. We find a similar pattern of increasing 
estimates as we narrow the interval around the threshold. When fitting a 
polynomial on each side of the threshold we obtain an estimate of the differential 
abnormal return of 1.76%, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Another way of visualizing these results is to plot the abnormal returns on the 
day of the meeting. Figure 3 shows the impact of passing Say-on-Pay proposals 
on abnormal returns on the day of the vote. The daily abnormal returns were 
calculated from CRSP using the Market model for Figure 3 (results are similar 
with the four factor model). The graph plots the smoothed average daily abnormal 
return for the day of the meeting (t = 0) when the information of the vote is 
revealed.	    The X-axis reflects the margin of victory (the vote share minus the 
threshold for that vote). On the day of the vote, Say-on-Pay proposals that pass by 
a small margin have positive abnormal returns and comparing those to proposals 
that fail by a small margin gives us the differential effect of passing such 
proposals on abnormal returns. For votes further away from the threshold the 
abnormal return is indistinguishable from zero. One could be concerned that 
outliers could drive the shape of the figure, in Figure 4 we replicate the exercise: 
each point in the graph computes median (instead of mean) abnormal returns of 
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the 20 nearest vote outcomes and shows very similar results.16  
In our data, proposals that pass with a very small margin of victory (up to 3%) 
have a positive abnormal return, and this decreases sharply with the distance to 
the threshold, suggesting that the market is able to predict votes that pass by large 
margins. Similarly, proposals that fail by a small margin have a negative 
abnormal return, and the return is decreasing in the vote share to the left of the 
threshold. 
Even if a substantial part of the information about the vote is released on the 
day of the meeting, we explore any further gains (or potential reversals) beyond 
the day of the vote.17 Table 4 reports the regression for equation (2) where the 
outcome variable yf t denotes abnormal returns computed in different event 
windows around the day of the vote. We use the entire sample of data and a 
polynomial of order three in the vote share on each side of the threshold. First, in 
column 1 the dependent variable is abnormal returns the day before the vote. The 
small and statistically insignificant coefficient indicates that the effect of Say-on-
Pay is not foreseen by the market the day before the vote for any of the 
benchmarks in Panels A and B. Column 2 shows the effect on the day of the vote 
(identical to column 6 of Table 3). Next, in Column 3 onwards we find that 
passing a Say-on-Pay proposal delivers abnormal returns beyond the day of the 
vote. Column 3 shows the impact on a two-day window that includes the day of 
the vote and the following day. The coefficients are 2.4% for the market model 
and 2.1% for the four factor model, which are close to the ones on the day of the 
vote and statistically significant. Column 4 displays a similar estimate for the two-
week window: 2.5% for the market model and 2.4% for the four factor model. 
 
16Each point in the y axis represents the median abnormal return (on the day of the vote) of the ten nearest votes along each 
side of the x axis. The discrete jumps in the graph correspond to changes in the median observation as the window changes. 
The advantage of this approach is that the results are not sensitive to the presence of outliers or driven by a few 
observations. 
17 Say-on-Pay proposals are closely followed by the media. Moreover, a variety of channels such as newswires and real-
time broadcasts disclose the vote outcome on the day of the annual meeting.  
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Finally, Column 5 shows growing estimates of 5.2% and 7.2%, for cumulative 
returns up to six weeks; indicating that there is no reversal six weeks after the 
vote. Standard errors are much larger (and estimates not significant) in longer 
windows, since there are many other events driving stock prices and creating 
noise, although the fact that there is no reversal in the estimated coefficients 
suggests that the Say-on-Pay effect is persistent.  
Overall, we find that the large positive market reaction to passing a Say-on-Pay 
proposal is sustained and even increases following the vote. The results are 
similar when controlling explicitly for all the other governance proposals voted on 
in the annual meeting (See columns 1 and 3 of Table A3), and also when we use a 
dynamic RD estimator that includes other proposals and estimates the effect of the 
vote on all periods simultaneously (see Columns 2 and 4 in Table A3).18  This 
confirms that the vote outcome of other proposals is not systematically related to 
the outcome of the Say-on-Pay vote around the discontinuity, such that we can 
use throughout the simpler specification of Equation (2). In the following sections 
we go beyond the stock market reaction and explore the different channels that 
may be driving this market reaction. 
 
4.2. Implementation 
 
This section documents how much the implementation probability of a Say-on-
Pay proposal changes at the vote majority threshold, with three main objectives in 
mind. Firstly, given that the vote outcome on shareholder proposals is typically 
non-binding it is important to establish whether passing a proposal has an impact 
on implementation. Secondly, our identification strategy relies on a discontinuity 
(a discrete change) in the implementation probability of a Say-on-Pay proposal at 
 
18 The methodology of the in Table A3 follows closely Cuñat, Giné and Guadalupe (2012). 
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the majority threshold, so it is important to explicitly test for this assumption. 
Finally, while we have established the market reaction to passing a proposal, this 
market reaction takes into account the fact that proposals will be implemented 
with a certain probability. In order to estimate the actual value of implementing a 
Say-on-Pay proposal we need to re-scale the market reaction, dividing by the 
discrete jump in the probability of implementation around the vote threshold 
between passing and not passing. 
We collected complete implementation data from SEC filings for all voted 
proposals in our sample. The graph in Figure 3 illustrates the empirical 
probability of implementing a proposal using a flexible function of the vote on 
each side of the discontinuity.19 The probability of implementation increases 
almost monotonically in the vote share, but we observe a discrete jump at the 
majority threshold. Table 5 estimates the size of the jump at the discontinuity. 
Column 1 shows that for the whole sample, a proposal that passes has a 52.5% 
higher probability of being implemented than one that does not. This is an average 
estimate for all vote outcomes, whereas we seek to estimate whether the 
probability of implementation changes just around the discontinuity. To do so we 
replicate the analysis in Table 3 and estimate how passing a proposal changes the 
probability of implementation for increasingly small vote intervals around the 
majority threshold. Intuitively, passing should lead to a lower differential 
probability of implementation as we narrow the interval. However, around 1.5% 
of the majority threshold (Column 5), the differential probability of 
implementation is still quite high (45.8%) and statistically significant. Column 6 
displays the full model given by equation (2) and estimated using a polynomial in 
the vote share of order three on each side of the threshold: We obtain a very 
similar coefficient of 52.5%, significant at the 5% significance level. 
 
19 In particular, we use an average kernel smoother with a bandwidth of approximately 20 observations. 
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With this estimate of the probability of implementation in hand we can provide 
a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the value of a Say-on-Pay proposal. Using the 
abnormal returns from Table 3 of 2.4%, and re-scaling by a probability of 
implementation around the threshold of 52.5%, the value of a Say-on-Pay 
proposal is estimated to be about 4.6%.20 
4.3. The effect of Say-on-Pay on firm outcomes 
We have established that the market reaction to passing a Say-on-Pay 
provision is positive. This may reflect market perceptions of the potential cost-
savings and managerial efficiency gains as a result of the Say-on-Pay provision. 
As described in Section 2, there are at least two channels by which Say-on-Pay 
can deliver better firm performance: first, through a stricter alignment of pay with 
performance; second, through more efficient monitoring and the risk of the CEO 
being dismissed if the vote does not pass. Given that a negative outcome on the 
subsequent Say-on-Pay votes sends a very negative signal, the CEO may change 
behavior out of concern for his/her career. In this section we evaluate the effects 
of Say-on-Pay proposals that may result from closer monitoring and better 
contractual incentives.  
Tables 5 and 6 show the impact of passing a Say-on-Pay proposal on variables 
that capture firm profitability, long-term performance and other real outcomes. 
Each cell corresponds to a different regression that measures the effect of passing 
a proposal at the discontinuity. We again use the identification strategy given by 
equation (2) with third order polynomials on each side of the majority threshold. 
Each column corresponds to a different dependent variable yf t and each panel to a 
 
20 This re-scaling gives an approximation of the actual effect of implementation. It is equivalent to the point estimate of an 
IV regression. Although within our sample we cannot estimate the first stage of an IV regression with enough precision, we 
show in Table 5 that the jump in implementation is statistically different from zero. This is consistent with the previous 
governance literature that also finds that there is a jump in implementation at the majority threshold of non-binding 
shareholder proposals. 
22 
 
different year-to-year effect. 
We denote as year t the year in which the Say-on-Pay proposal is voted. 
Annual meetings are held between two fiscal year ends, which is when the 
variables used in this and the following sections are recorded.21 Therefore we 
define the time periods such that there are at least six months between the annual 
meeting when the vote is held and fiscal year end t. This means that the change 
between t and t -1 includes some pre-treatment months and at least 6 of the first 
post-treatment months. The dependent variables in the first panel measure 
changes in the variables from t-1 to t. In the second they measure changes from 
the end of the year of the vote t until the first full year after the Say-on-Pay vote 
(t+1). Variables are winsorized at the 5% level. 
Table 6 reports the effect of passing a Say-on-Pay proposal on commonly used 
profitability measures. We define the dependent variables in this table as changes 
within the firm to identify the within-firm effect of Say-on-Pay. Overall, Table 6 
shows that there are no significant effects of Say-on-Pay between t-1 and t, but 
significant increases in profitability between t and t+1. More specifically, firms 
passing Say-on-Pay have $3.5 higher earnings per share, a 5.8% higher return on 
assets, and a 5.1% higher return on operating assets between t and t+1. All these 
effects are significant at 1% and economically quite large, which is consistent 
with the large market value effects found earlier. They also have higher Tobin’s Q 
(0.13) and return on equity (0.11), although these are not significant at standard 
levels.  
How is this better performance attained? In Table 7 we examine measures of 
firm strategy and performance beyond earnings to understand the mechanisms 
through which performance improves. Again, we find that there are few 
significant changes between t-1 and t (only an increase in employment that is not 
 
21 Most of the proxy season takes place between April and June - 88% of the proposals in our sample take place before 
June. 
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sustained the following period), and that most of the significant improvement 
occurs between t and t+1 and is sustained thereafter. The most striking result is 
that we find a 21.6% and highly significant higher increase in labor productivity 
(defined as the growth in sales per worker) in firms that pass Say-on-Pay between 
t and t+1 (Column 1). Column 2 finds no significant drop in employment that 
could be driving this result. Furthermore, in the same period net income grows 
more, and capital expenditure and overheads (SG&A) drop significantly in firms 
that pass a Say-on-Pay vote. This suggests that the firm is more efficiently run, 
since (potentially superfluous) capital expenditure and costly overheads are 
reduced. In contrast, we found no significant changes in other firm policies such 
as leverage. Interestingly, total payout (dividend and share repurchases) grows by 
1.8%, although this is not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
In sum, CEOs and executives seem to be reacting the Say-on-Pay provision by 
delivering better earnings and returns to shareholders. This performance 
improvement is accompanied by better productivity ratios, higher net income 
growth, a reduction in overheads, and lower rates of increases in capital 
expenditure. Say-on-Pay provisions seem to push CEOs to deliver stronger 
performance: they cut costs while increasing productivity. The economic 
magnitude of our estimates on performance is quite large, which suggests that the 
changes in behavior accompanying Say-on-Pay around the threshold are 
significant and consistent with the market value response, although we cannot rule 
out that some of these effects are short lived or the result of earnings 
manipulation. Moreover, since these are local effects by design there is a problem 
of extrapolation – whether we can expect such large effects to apply to firms 
outside our sample or far from the discontinuity. However, at the very least our 
results suggest that firms where proposals failed by a small margin would have 
benefited greatly from it passing.  
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4.4. The effect of Say-on-Pay on CEO compensation 
The main objective of Say-on-Pay proposals is to improve the alignment of 
CEO incentives with firm objectives. In this section we examine whether passing 
a Say-on-Pay proposal has an impact on the level and on the incentive structure of 
CEO pay. 
In Table 8 we report the effect of Say-on-Pay at the discontinuity threshold on 
changes in different elements of CEO compensation. We measure all the 
monetary variables in percentage growth rates, so that the effects we report can be 
interpreted as the differential growth in the variable between firms that approve or 
reject Say-on-Pay by a close margin. Column 1 reports the effect on total CEO 
compensation. Although the coefficients are negative, we do not observe a 
statistically significant change in the growth rates of CEO compensation in the 
two years following the passing of a Say-on-Pay proposal. Column 2 reports the 
effect of Say-on-Pay on the probability of CEO turnover. If Say-on-Pay proposals 
induce better shareholder monitoring, they may increase the probability of 
turnover. On the other hand, CEOs may respond by performing better, offsetting 
the increased monitoring and lowering the chance of being dismissed. The 
estimates for the effect on the probability of turnover are negative but not 
significant, so CEO exit is comparable between firms that pass Say-on-Pay and 
those that do not (one cannot accurately distinguish between voluntary and forced 
departures with the existing data).  
Next we look into the changes on CEO compensation within firms that do not 
change their CEO. Column 3 reports a similar pattern to Column 1, and the 
estimates are again not statistically different from zero. Taken together, the results 
in Columns 1 to 3 show no significant effects of Say-on-Pay on total CEO 
compensation or turnover. 
We now turn to the different components of CEO pay. Column 4 reports the 
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impact of passing Say-on-Pay on changes in salary: the rate of increase in salary 
is 4.4% lower one year after the passing of the Say-on-Pay proposal. This is in 
line with the effort to reduce the amount of compensation that is not sensitive to 
performance. Column 5 reports the effect on increases in variable compensation 
(granting of stock, options and bonus) and shows no particular differential pattern 
between firms that pass Say-on-Pay proposals and those that do not. Columns 6 to 
8 focus on options and stock. The results suggest a statistically insignificant 
decrease in the growth of the option portfolio (column 6), the stock portfolio  
(column 7) and the delta of the stock and option portfolio in the period (i.e. its 
sensitivity to firm value) immediately following the vote, followed by a 
significant increase in those three variables between t and t+1.22 This suggests 
there is no clear reaction in one direction for these components following the Say-
on-Pay vote. (Note that the increase in performance-pay sensitivity could be 
induced by higher grants of options and shares, or more ‘mechanically’ through 
changes in the share price of firms).   
We also explicitly evaluate changes in the structure of pay. All dependent 
variables in Table 9 are calculated as the change in the share of each pay 
component (stock awards, option awards, bonus, perks and deferred earnings) in 
total compensation (as measured in Execucomp by tdc1). In column 1, if 
anything, we see a decrease in the share of stock awards (a 9.1% decrease in the 
first period, significant at 10%, and a further 9% in the following period, although 
the latter is not significant). The share of option awards shows positive but not 
significant coefficients, casting some doubt on whether the results in Columns 6 
and 8 of Table 8 reflect a conscious strategy of firms or simply a change in the 
value and option deltas of pre-existing option packages. There are no clear 
significant patterns with respect to bonus awards. 
 
22The total delta of the portfolio measures the change in the dollar value of the stock and option portfolio per dollar change 
in the value of the firm stock and is calculated following Core and Guay (1999).  
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Finally, we find no effect in the share of compensation that is defined as perks 
and could be interpreted as private benefits (Column 4), nor in deferred 
compensation. 
Overall, the results in this section show no systematic or sustained effects of 
Say-on-Pay on CEO compensation. Total pay does not change (other than a small 
decline in salary), and the different components of compensation do not change in 
an identifiable and consistent manner. While some results might be suggestive of 
a shift from fixed pay to more variable pay (consistent with the stated objectives 
of most Say-on-Pay proposals) this conclusion is not robust across different 
measures. The absence of a significant effect on pay levels or pay structure can 
result from Say-on-Pay having no effect on pay, but could also be explained by 
adjustments in pay packages that are heterogeneous across firms. Even if there is 
room for improvement in CEO pay packages, the deviation from the optimal 
contract may vary across firms: If each firm responds in a different way or 
requires a different treatment, this would induce imprecise estimates of the 
average effect of Say-on-Pay. In any case, we can rule out the notion that Say-on-
Pay systematically curbs compensation across firms. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Say-on-Pay constitutes is a useful instrument to study how changes in 
shareholder voice affect firm value and strategy. The declared role of Say-on-Pay 
proposals is to improve CEO pay policies and align them with firm performance. 
As such, Say-on-Pay may affect firm value through better designed pay structures 
that motivate CEOs. It also lowers the shareholder cost of expressing dissent, and 
therefore makes monitoring by shareholders more attractive and effective. We 
have explored the relative relevance of all of these mechanisms that potentially 
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explain the shareholder reaction to the implementation of Say-on-Pay. 
The use of a regression discontinuity design on the outcomes of shareholders 
proposals to adopt a Say-on-Pay policy allows us to deal with the presence of 
prior expectations and estimate the causal effect of adopting the policy. We find 
that adopting Say-on-Pay generates value for shareholders. Say-on-Pay proposals 
that pass yield, on average, an abnormal return of 2.5% relative to those that fail 
on the day of the vote. We thus estimate the actual value of a Say-on-Pay proposal 
to be around 4.6% of firm value, an economically sizeable effect that potentially 
arises through different channels. 
We find that firms that pass Say-on-Pay display stronger performance 
outcomes. CEOs seem to be reacting to having a Say-on-Pay provision in place by 
delivering better earnings per share, stronger profitability and higher Tobin's Q. 
We also find that Say-on-Pay leads to higher labor productivity and reductions in 
overheads and capital expenditure. In short, Say-on-Pay provisions appear to lead 
to more efficiency and stronger firm performance. 
We find no effect of Say-on-Pay on total CEO compensation. In terms of pay 
composition, we find significant effects but these are contradictory and there is no 
systematic pattern. Despite this we cannot rule out the idea that adjustments to 
pay packages may be heterogeneous across firms. Even if there is room for 
improvement in CEO pay packages, not all firms necessarily respond in the same 
way. If each firm requires a different treatment this would induce imprecise 
estimates of the effect of Say-on-Pay. 
Our results confirm that Say-on-Pay is akin to an annual confidence vote in 
which shareholders approve or reject the CEOs performance relative to pay, that it 
empowers shareholders by offering a mechanism through which they can punish 
poor CEO performance, and that firms perform better as a result.  
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Figure	  3:	  Abnormal	  Returns	  -­‐	  Day	  of	  the	  Vote	  
Means	  
Non-parametric regression of market model returns using a tri-
cube weight and a bandwidth of twenty observations	  
	   Figure	  4:	  Abnormal	  Returns	  –	  Day	  of	  the	  Vote	  
Medians	  
Median returns of market model on a window of twenty 
observations	  
 
 
	  
	  
Figure	  5:	  Probability	  of	  Implementation	  
Non-parametric regression of the probability of implementation using a 
tri-cube weight and a bandwidth of twenty observations	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TABLE 1 
Shareholder Say-on-Pay Proposals  
Panel A displays the frequency of Say on Pay voted proposals, the percent of passed and the 
average support over time.  Data is collected by Riskmetrics on all shareholders Say on Pay 
proposals from 2006 until 2010 for all S&P 1,500 companies plus an additional 500 widely 
held firms. For all of our observations the threshold to pass a proposal is 50%.  
Panel A. Shareholder Proposal Summary Statistics 
Year Voted Proposals 
Passed 
Proposals 
Percentage 
Passed 
Proposals 
Average 
Vote 
Outcome 
# -5, +5 # -10,+10 
2006 7 0 0% 40.11 0 5 
2007 51 6 11.76% 40.9 13 31 
2008 68 9 13.24% 41.35 21 43 
2009 78 24 30.77% 45.97 35 54 
2010 46 12 26.09% 44.93 19 35 
Total 250 51 20.4% 43.33 88 168 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics  
This table describes the Say on Pay sample. All accounting variables are obtained from Compustat: Market Value (mkvalt_f), Tobin's Q is defined as the market 
value of assets divided by the book value of assets ((AT-CEQ+mkvalt-txditc)/AT),  Earnings per Share (EPS), Return on Equity (NI/(CEQ+TXDITC)), Return on 
Assets (NI/AT), OROA (Cashflow/Total Assets),  Net Income (EBITDA-INTPN), Leverage ((DLTT+DLC)/AT), Total Payout  ((DVT+PRSTKC)/AT), 
Overheads (XSGA/XOPR), Capex  (Capex/AT),  Number of Employees (EMP), Sales per Worker (SALE/EMP), Total Assets (AT). CEO Pay is defined as TDC1 
in Execucomp.  Abnormal Pay is defined as the residuals of a regression of levels of total pay that includes assets, assets squared, market returns and market 
returns squared, year and industry dummies (SIC 3 digit) estimated at a SIC 2 digit level for the whole Execucomp sample. Variable compensation is the sum of 
options and stock awards. Option portfolio is the Black-Scholes value of the options including reloads. Stock Portfolio is the total value of shares excluding 
options. Delta Portfolio measures the change in the dollar value of the stock and option portfolio per dollar change in the value of the firm stock and is calculated 
following Core and Guay (1999).  Ownership variables are generated from Thomson 13F database.  All monetary values are in 2010 US$. 
 
Mean Median Std. dev. 
10th 
Per. 
90th 
Per.  Mean Median 
Std. 
dev. 
10th 
Per. 
90th 
Per. 
Market Value ($mil) 54,877 30,648 59,002 2,805 160,612 CEO Pay (Thou.) 15,088 13,543 10,000 4,118 30,501 
Tobin Q 1.59 1.35 0.66 0.96 2.71 Abnormal Pay -532.64 -691.74 7,792 -10,383 11,397 
Earnings per Share (EPS) 2.30 2.38 2.60 0.84 5.60 Salary (Thou.) 1,337 1,237 5,961 1,472 17,002 
Return on Equity 0.12 0.134 0.211 -0.10 0.35 
Variable Compensation 
(Thou.) 8,323 6,918 5,961 1,472 17,002 
Return on Assets  0.11 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.22 Option Portfolio (Thou.)  40,814 20,260 52,744 1,375 104,769 
OROA (Cashflow/ Assets) 0.08 0.09 0.065 0.002 0.16 Stock Portfolio (Thou.) 63,734 21,499 103,496 3,156 186,479 
Net Income 3,501 2,017 4,256 -107 11,917 Delta Portfolio 1,628 747 1,979 160 4,609 
Leverage (Debt/Assets) 0.27 0.24 0.16 0.08 0.55 Share of Stock Awards 0.31 0.32 0.24 0 0.67 
Total Payout  0.058 0.044 0.053 0.003 0.15 Share of Option Awards 0.23 0.21 0.21 0 0.58 
Overheads (SGA/Op.Exp.) 0.28 0.25 0.17 0.06 0.55 Share of Bonus 0.04 0 0.10 0 0.20 
Capex  0.042 0.032 0.34 0.002 0.096 Share of Perks 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.004 0.08 
Num. Employees (Thou.) 96.7 55.4 107.2 5.8 312.02 Share of Deferred Comp. 0.016 0.001 0.101 0 0.13 
Sales per Worker 653 422 584 213 1,479 
Ownership by Instit. 
Shareholders 0.72 0.71 0.12 0.56 0.89 
Total Assets 115,486 39,437 211,754 4,399 260,303 
Ownership by Top 5 
Shareholders 0.24 0.22 0.06 0.16 0.35 
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TABLE 3 
Abnormal Returns around the Majority Threshold 
This table presents regressions of the abnormal returns on the day of the meeting t=0, on whether 
the Say-on-Pay proposal passed.  Abnormal returns are computed using two benchmarks: market 
model and four factor model (Fama French and momentum factors; Carhart,1997). Column 1 
estimates are based on the whole sample. Column 2 restricts the sample to observations with a vote 
share within ten points of the threshold, column 3 to five points and so forth. Column 6 introduces 
a polynomial in the vote share of order 3, one on each side of the threshold, and uses the full 
sample. All columns control include year dummies; standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered 
by firm. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. Market Model  
  All votes -10;+10 -5;+5 -2.5;+2.5 -1.5;+1.5 Full Model 
Pass -0.00210 0.000462 0.00433 0.0139** 0.0188** 0.0241*** 
 (0.00316) (0.00381) (0.00472) (0.00603) (0.00696) (0.00889) 
       Obs 250 168 88 43 28 250 
R-squared 0.017 0.000 0.013 0.140 0.253 0.091 
       
       B. Fama French & Momentum 
  All votes -10;+10 -5;+5 -2.5;+2.5 -1.5;+1.5 Full Model 
Pass -0.00389 -0.00320 -0.000276 0.00864 0.0151** 0.0176** 
 (0.00320) (0.00393) (0.00484) (0.00598) (0.00678) (0.00861) 
       Obs 250 168 88 43 28 250 
R-squared 0.028 0.007 0.000 0.059 0.179 0.078 
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TABLE 5 
The Effect of Passing a Proposal on Implementation 
This table presents the effect of passing a Say-on-Pay proposal on Implementation. Column 1 
estimates are based on the whole sample. Column 2 restricts the sample to observations with a 
vote share within ten points of the threshold, column 3 to five points and so forth. Column 6 
introduces a polynomial in the vote share of order 3 on each side of the threshold, and uses the 
full sample. All columns include year dummies; standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by 
firm. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  All -10;+10 -5;+5 -2.5;+2.5 -1.5;+1.5 Full Model 
       Pass 0.525*** 0.470*** 0.482*** 0.393** 0.458** 0.525** 
 
(0.0810) (0.0981) (0.114) (0.167) (0.214) (0.240) 
       Observations 201 132 68 31 20 201 
R-squared 0.344 0.241 0.261 0.159 0.222 0.365 
 
TABLE 4 
Abnormal Returns beyond the Day of the Meeting  
This table presents the effect of passing a Say-on-Pay proposal on abnormal returns around 
different event windows. Column 1 reports the effect of pass one day before the meeting. 
Column 2 reports the effect on the day of the meeting. Column 3, 4 and 5 report the effect of 
pass on the cumulative abnormal returns for two days, two weeks and six weeks 
respectively. Abnormal returns are computed using two benchmarks:  market model and 
four factor model (Fama French and momentum factors; Carhart,1997).  The specification is 
equation (2) and uses a polynomial in the vote share of order 3 on each side of the threshold. 
All columns include year dummies; standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm. 
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
A. Market Model  
  day before 
vote 
day of vote two days two weeks six weeks 
Pass 0.00552 0.0241*** 0.0242* 0.0254 0.0516 
 (0.00766) (0.00889) (0.0128) (0.0323) (0.0499) 
      Obs 250 250 250 250 250 
R-squared 0.113 0.091 0.085 0.060 0.088 
      B. Fama French & Momentum 
  day before 
vote 
day of vote two days two weeks six weeks 
Pass 0.00236 0.0176** 0.0211** 0.0240 0.0716 
 (0.00787) (0.00861) (0.0106) (0.0265) (0.0478) 
      Obs 250 250 250 250 250 
R-squared 0.074 0.078 0.088 0.047 0.030 
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TABLE 6 
Effect of Say-on-Pay Proposals on Firm Profitability  
This table presents the effect of passing a Say-on-Pay proposal on firm profitability measures. 
We estimate the specification in equation (2) using a polynomial in the vote share of order 3 
on each side of the threshold. The dependent variables are obtained from Compustat are all 
defined as within firm changes. Column 1 reports changes in Tobin's Q, defined as the market 
value of assets divided by the book value of assets ((AT-CEQ+mkvalt-txditc)/AT). Column 2, 
3 and 4 report the change in Earnings per Share (EPS), Return on Equity 
(NI/(CEQ+TXDITC)) and Return on Assets (NI/AT), respectively. Column 5 reports the 
change in the Operating Return on Assets (CashFlow /AT).  All dependent variables are 
winsorized at the 5th and 95th  percentile. All columns include year dummies. Standard errors 
(in parentheses) are clustered by firm. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are 
indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Tobin Q 
Change 
EPS   Change ROE Change ROA Change OROA 
(CashFlow 
/AT) Change 
Effect from t-1 to t 
    Say on 
Pay 0.0517 -0.677 0.0552 -0.0121 0.00891 
 
(0.0876) (1.149) (0.0767) (0.0226) (0.0176) 
      Obs. 241 250 250 250 247 
R-sq. 0.259 0.122 0.065 0.083 0.060 
Effect from t to t+1 
    Say on 
Pay 0.134 3.502*** 0.107 0.0583*** 0.0511*** 
 
(0.0865) (0.976) (0.0768) (0.0172) (0.0157) 
      Obs. 184 192 192 192 188 
R-sq. 0.303 0.217 0.136 0.214 0.195 
 
  
37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TABLE 7 
Real Effects of Say-on-Pay Proposals  
This table presents the effect of passing a Say-on-Pay proposal on firm outcomes.  We estimate the specification in equation (2) using a 
polynomial in the vote share of order 3 on each side of the threshold. The dependent variables are obtained from Compustat are defined in 
growth terms  or changes (depending on whether they are in levels or ratios). Column 1 reports the growth in labor productivity defined as 
sales per worker (SALE/EMP). Column 2 reports growth in Employment (EMP). Column 3 reports growth in Net Income (EBITDA-INTPN), 
Column 4 reports the change in Total Payout ((DVT+PRSTKC)/AT). Column 5 reports changes in the Capex ratio (Capex/AT). Column 6 
reports the change in Overheads (XSGA/XOPR). Column 7 reports the growth in Total Assets (AT) and column 8 changes in the leverage 
ratio (DLTT+DLC/AT). All dependent variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. All columns include year dummies. Standard 
errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Labor 
Productivity 
Growth 
Employment 
Growth 
Net Income 
Growth 
Total Payout 
Change 
Capex/ Total 
Assets 
Change 
Overheads 
Change 
Total Assets 
Growth 
Leverage/ 
Total Assets 
Change 
Effect from t-1 to t   
 
    
   Say on 
Pay -0.0928 0.0794* -0.102 0.00419 -0.00656 -0.0121* 0.0442 0.00197 
 
(0.0578) (0.0444) (0.313) (0.0131) (0.00669) (0.00725) (0.0626) (0.0158) 
    
  
    Obs. 250 250 250 238 245 209 250 249 
R-sq. 0.153 0.086 0.053 0.140 0.173 0.053 0.082 0.076 
Effect from t to t+1 
  
  
    Say on 
Pay 0.216*** -0.0601 0.940*** 0.0180 -0.0118** -0.0260*** -0.00125 -0.000436 
 
(0.0645) (0.0626) (0.277) (0.0126) (0.00568) (0.00946) (0.0759) (0.0199) 
    
  
    Obs. 191 191 192 183 189 158 192 191 
R-sq. 0.149 0.060 0.167 0.210 0.095 0.078 0.061 0.082 
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TABLE 8 
Changes in the Level of Compensation 
This table presents the effect of passing a Say-on-Pay proposal on compensation measures. We estimate the specification in equation (2) using a 
polynomial in the vote share of order 3 on each side of the threshold. The dependent variables are obtained from Execucomp. Column 1 reports growth in 
Total Compensation (TDC1), column 2 the change in CEO Turnover and column 3 growth in Total Compensation within CEO.  Column 4 reports growth 
in Salary and column 5 growth in Variable Compensation (Stock_awards_fv+Option_awards_fv+Bonus+ Noneq_Incent). Column 6 and 7 report growth 
in Option and Stock Portfolio, respectively. Column 8 reports growth in Stock and Option Portfolio Delta. All dependent variables are winsorized at the 
5th and 95th  percentile. All columns control for year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm. Significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)   Total 
Compensation 
Growth 
Change in 
CEO 
(Turnover) 
 Total 
Compensation 
Growth 
Salary 
Growth 
 Variable 
Compensation 
Growth 
Option 
Portfolio 
Growth 
 Stock 
Portfolio 
Growth 
 Delta Growth 
Stock & Option 
Portfolio  
   
Within CEO Within CEO Within CEO Within CEO Within CEO Within CEO 
                  
Effect from t-1 to t     
   yes -0.155 -0.0259 -0.0212 -0.00893 -0.110 -0.328 -0.256 -0.316 
 (0.143) (0.111) (0.124) (0.0171) (0.129) (0.452) (0.276) (0.214) 
         Obs 233 238 210 208 201 194 204 201 
R-sq 0.058 0.043 0.106 0.068 0.100 0.392 0.108 0.354 
Effect from t to t+1 
       yes -0.212 -0.0362 -0.173 -0.0443*** -0.197 0.599** 0.531 0.349** 
 (0.194) (0.0986) (0.197) (0.0167) (0.239) (0.264) (0.414) (0.137) 
         Obs 179 179 159 157 153 143 153 154 
R-sq 0.038 0.045 0.054 0.073 0.058 0.335 0.191 0.375 
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TABLE 9 
Changes in the Structure of Compensation 
This table presents the effect of passing a Say-on-Pay proposal on the structure of compensation.  We 
estimate the specification in equation (2) using a polynomial in the vote share of order 3 on each side 
of the threshold.The dependent variables are obtained from Execucomp. Column 1 changes in the 
Share of Stock Awards (stock_awards_fv /tdc1), and column 2 changes in the Share of Option 
Awards (option_awards_fv/tdc1), and column 3 reports changes in the Share of Bonus (bonus/tdc1). 
Column 4 reports the change in the Share of Perks (othcomp/tdc1) and column 5 the change in the 
Share of Deferred Compensation (defer_earnings_tot/tdc1).  All dependent variables are winsorized at 
the 5th and 95th  percentile. All columns include year dummies.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Share of Stock 
Awards  
Share of 
Option 
Awards  
Share of Bonus  Share of 
Perks 
Share of 
Deferred 
Compensation 
Effect from t-1 to t     
yes -0.0913* 0.0314 0.00436 0.00353 -0.0365 
 (0.0488) (0.0558) (0.0122) (0.00853) (0.0675) 
      Obs 204 204 210 210 204 
R-sq 0.044 0.063 0.218 0.083 0.325 
Effect from t to t+1 
    yes -0.0899 0.0901 -0.0341 0.000587 -0.0189 
 (0.0656) (0.0701) (0.0259) (0.0113) (0.122) 
      Obs 159 159 159 159 159 
R-sq 0.126 0.075 0.149 0.020 0.159 
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Appendix: FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION 
TABLE A1 
 Sample Selection 
This table compares the Say on Pay sample of 250 voted proposals with the 
SP1500 universe for the year 2005. All accounting variables are obtained 
from Compustat: Market Value (mkvalt_f), Tobin's Q is defined as the 
market value of assets (AT+mkvalt_f-CEQ) divided by the book value of 
assets (AT), and balance sheet Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit 
(TXDITC), Return on Equity (NI/(CEQ+TXDITC)), Return on Assets 
(NI/AT), OROA (Cashflow/Total Assets),  Leverage ((DLTT+DLC)/AT), 
Overheads (XSGA/XOPR), Total Payout  ((DVT+PRSTKC)/AT), Sales per 
Worker (SALE/EMP), Number of Employees (EMP).  CEO Pay is defined 
as TDC1 in Execucomp. Abnormal Pay is defined as the residuals of a 
regression of levels of total pay that includes assets, assets squared, market 
returns and market returns squared, year and industry dummies (SIC 3 digit) 
estimated at a SIC 2 digit level for the whole Execucomp sample.  
Ownership variables are generated from Thomson 13F database.  All 
monetary values are in 2010 US$. Note that the number of observations may 
change due to missing values in some of the variables. 
 
SoP vs. SP1500 (2005) 
 Mean SoP  
Mean 
SP1500  t-test 
Market Value ($mil) 22,127 5,649 11.5 
Tobin Q 1.78 1.95 2.2 
Return on Equity 0.15 0.12 2 
Return on Assets  0.11 0.12 -1.21 
OROA (Cashflow/Total Assets) 0.094 0.099 -0.85 
Leverage (Debt/Assets) 0.25 0.19 4.22 
Total Payout  0.056 0.042 2.5 
Overheads (SGA/Op.Exp.) 0.29 0.31 -1.01 
Number Employees (Thousands) 44.39 13.36 11.2 
Sales per Worker 578 460 2.5 
CEO Pay (Thousands) 11,540 5,171 11.7 
Abnormal Pay 1048.4 -31.8 1.2 
Ownership by Instit. Shareholders 0.71 0.74 -2.6 
Ownership by Top 5 Shareholders .24 0.28 -5.8 
Number Shareholders own >  5% 2.1 2.5 -3.5 
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TABLE A2 
 Pre-differences in Firm Characteristics as a Function of the Vote Outcome 
Table A2 tests whether passing a Say-on-Pay vote on the meeting date is systematically related to firm 
characteristics prior to the meeting. Note that in Panel A t refers to days, while for the rest, t refers to years. 
Each row corresponds to a different dependent variable and each entry comes from a separate regression. 
Each entry in the table reports the coefficient on whether a proposal passed.  Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) 
report the estimated effect of passing a vote on outcome variable levels (changes) the year before the annual 
meeting, t-1 (between t-2 and t-1). Columns 1 and 3 present estimates without controlling for a polynomial 
in the vote share and, therefore, estimate the average effect of passing relative to not passing. Columns 2 
and 4 include the polynomial in the vote share of order 3 on each side of the threshold such that it 
effectively estimates the effect at the discontinuity.  All columns control for year fixed effects and standard 
errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm level.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are 
indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
  Before meeting (t-1) Change, from (t-2) to (t-1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A.       Abnormal Return one day before 
Meeting, Car (-1,-1) OLS -0.007* 0.006 -0.020 0.021 (0.004) (0.008) (0.017) (0.030) 
Abnormal Return one day before 
Meeting, Car (-1,-1) FFM -0.007* 0.002 -0.020 0.003 (0.004) (0.008) (0.017) (0.033) 
B.      
Tobin Q   -0.179 -0.192 0.017 0.098 
(0.160) (0.505) (0.059) (0.137) 
Return on Assets -0.047** 0.002 -0.033* -0.021 
(0.023) (0.057) (0.017) (0.045) 
OROA --Cash Flow -0.043** 0.016 -0.031** -0.024 
(0.021) (0.049) (0.014) (0.037) 
Return on Equity -0.478 -0.917 -0.421 -0.929 
(0.324) (0.751) (0.334) (0.778) 
Leverage/ Assets -0.075*** -0.089 0.004 0.019 
(0.026) (0.062) (0.006) (0.021) 
Overheads (SGA/Op. Exp.)  -0.078** -0.209** 0.000 0.003 
(0.036) (0.091) (0.004) (0.009) 
Earnings Per Share -1.302* -1.795 -0.376 -3.362 
(0.766) (2.135) (0.696) (2.396) 
Sales -22,864.203* 42,287.107 145.589 9,261.578 
(12,607.828) (30,612.852) (1,573.873) (6,311.584) 
Number Employees (Thousands) -84.706* -61.275 2.326 5.703 
(44.568) (92.892) (2.771) (5.134) 
C.      
Ceo Pay (Thousands) -4,768.8*** 4,195.7 -2,120.6 302.1 
 (1,767.3) (4,094.9) (2,283.9) (5,326.8) 
Ceo Stock Awards FV (Thousands)  -1,083.9 1,359.6 595.3 1,885.0 
(840.6) (2,480.6) (869.7) (2,222.6) 
Ceo Option Awards FV 
(Thousands) 
-2,027.8** 1,234.7 -754.9 -4,437.7* 
(1,024.3) (1,426.1) (941.6) (2,465.0) 
D. 
 
  
  Number Proposals -0.370 0.686 n.a. n.a. 
(0.233) (0.894) 
  Dummy Proposal Compensation -0.130 0.100 n.a. n.a. 
(0.088) (0.279) 
  Polynomial in the vote share no yes no yes 
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In Table A2 we examine whether there are any pre-existing differences at the majority 
threshold between firms that pass a Say-on-Pay proposal and firms that don't. Columns 
1 and 3 compare the characteristics of the whole population of firms, while columns 2 
and 4 report only the effect at the discontinuity by including polynomials of order three 
on either side of the threshold. Columns 1 and 2 refer to the variables in levels and 3 
and 4 in growth rates.  
Column 1 shows that, on average, firms that pass the proposal have different 
characteristics from those where the proposal fails. For instance, firms where the 
proposal is passed have on average lower prior return on assets than those where it fails. 
These are the kind of selection problems that would make the estimates of a standard 
OLS regression biased. In contrast, when we control for a polynomial in the vote share 
and estimate the effect at the discontinuity (in column 2 and 4), we find that these 
average differences across firms on each side of the threshold disappear. We do find 
some differences in the level of overheads and the growth rates of option grants 
although given the number of coefficients that we check it is expected that some of 
them would seem statistically different even if both samples are drawn from the same 
distribution.  
In general, we do not find any systematic differences between firms on each side of the 
majority threshold. 
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TABLE A3 
Abnormal Returns Controlling for Other Proposals 
Abnormal returns are computed using two benchmarks: a market model (in 
Columns 1 and 2) and a four factor model (Fama French and momentum factors; 
Carhart,1997) (in Columns 3 and 4). Columns 1 and 3 include as controls the 
vote outcome of other proposals in the same meeting, third order vote 
polynomials to each side of the discontinuity different for SoP votes and other 
votes and year dummies. Columns 2 and 4 include a dynamic specification and 
firm fixed effects, similar to Cuñat, Gine and Guadalupe (2012). The sample 
includes all votes from 2006 until June 2010. We drop observations outside the 
top (bottom) 1% of abnormal returns of the full sample. All columns control for 
year fixed effects and standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm 
level.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and 
*** respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Market Model Fama French & Momentum 
Say on Pay Proposals         
Day of the vote, t  0.021** 0.027*** 0.014* 0.018* 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
One day later, t+1 
 
0.010 
 
0.007 
  
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
Days t+2 to t+9 
 
-0.018 
 
-0.013 
 
  (0.024)   (0.021) 
Other Proposals 
 
  
  Day of the vote, t  0.006** 0.008** 0.004 0.006 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
One day later, t+1 
 
0.004 
 
0.001 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.005) 
Days t+2 to t+9 
 
0.020 
 
0.016 
 
  (0.013)   (0.011) 
  
  
  Observations 1,024 5,120 1,024 5,120 
R-squared 0.044 0.025 0.034 0.012 
Number of firms  517 517  517 517 
 
